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1. INTRODUCTION 
A new departure that widens and deepens economic governance in EMU 
Large and persistent macroeconomic imbalances - reflected in large and persistent external 
deficits and surpluses, sustained losses in competitiveness, the build up of indebtedness and 
housing market bubbles – accumulated over the past decade and were part of the root causes 
of the current economic crisis. They not only caused macroeconomic difficulties for the 
Member States concerned, but also serious spillovers which contribute to the threats facing 
the euro area.  
This Alert Mechanism Report (AMR) marks the first step in implementing the new 
surveillance procedure for the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances 
(hereafter called the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure – MIP). This report also contains 
the final design of the scoreboard of indicators (presented in Table 1 and Section 2). 
Surveillance to prevent and correct macroeconomic imbalances under the MIP is a new 
instrument of the strengthened framework for economic governance in the EU. It was adopted 
as part of the so-called 'six-pack' governance package which inter alia also provides for a 
significant reinforcement of surveillance on fiscal policies. Surveillance on macroeconomic 
imbalances under the MIP forms part of the "European semester" which takes an integrated 
and forward looking approach to the economic policy challenges facing the Union in ensuring 
fiscal sustainability, competitiveness, financial market stability and economic growth. 
The role and scope of the Alert Mechanism Report  
The role of the AMR is to work as an initial screening device where the Commission 
identifies Member States where it considers that developments warrant further in-depth 
analysis to determine whether imbalances
1 exist or risk emerging. It should be emphasised 
that it is in the following in-depth studies that the driving forces behind the observed 
developments are analysed in detail with a view to determining the nature of the imbalances. 
Only on the basis of such in-depth analysis and, if appropriate, the Commission will propose 
policy recommendations, either under the preventive or the corrective arm of the procedure. 
The in-depth studies and the proposals for recommendations will be part of the European 
semester.  
The need for further analysis is based on an assessment of a scoreboard of indicators 
established by the Commission after consultation with the Council, the European Parliament 
and the European Systemic Risk Board (see Section 2 and Tables 1 and 2 below)
2. It should 
be emphasised that the scoreboard indicators are not mechanically interpreted. Countries are 
assessed by looking at the evolution of indicators over time as well as taking into account the 
most recent developments and outlook. In addition, the assessment takes into account a 
combination of additional relevant information. Also, the Commission pays particular 
attention to a wider set of indicators (see Section 2, Table 3), which the Council and European 
Parliament stressed as being of particular relevance in an economic reading of the scoreboard.  
                                                 
1  The definition of imbalances is found in Article 2 in the regulation on the prevention and correction of 
macroeconomic imbalances.   
2  The Council endorsed the scoreboard in the conclusions of the ECOFIN Council of 7 November 2011. The 
European Parliament adopted a resolution on 15 December 2011. The ESRB responded in a letter dated 9 
December 2011.   
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Section 2 presents the design of the alert mechanism scoreboard. Section 3 makes a horizontal 
and thematic reading of the situation based on a reading of the scoreboard. In section 4 the 
analysis of the scoreboard is made per country. Section 5 provides main findings and 
conclusions.   
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Table 1. Scoreboard indicators and indicative thresholds (*) 
 
  External imbalances and competitiveness Internal  imbalances 
Indicator 
3 year 
average of 
current 
account 
balance  
as a % 
of GDP 
Net 
International 
Investment 
Position as a 
%  
of GDP 
% change  
(3 years) of  
Real Effective 
Exchange Rate, 
HICP deflators 
relative to 35 
industrial 
countries (a)  
% change  
(5 years) in  
export 
market 
shares 
% change  
(3 years) in 
nominal unit 
labour cost (b) 
y-o-y % 
change in 
deflated 
house prices 
(c) 
private sector 
credit flow  
as % 
of GDP (d), (e) 
private 
sector debt 
as % 
of GDP (d), 
(e) 
general 
government 
debt 
as % 
of GDP 
(f) 
3 year 
average of 
unemploy-
ment rate 
 
Data 
source 
Balance of 
Payments 
statistics 
EUROSTAT. 
 
Balance of 
Payments 
Statistics, 
EUROSTAT. 
 
DG ECFIN indicator 
data base on Price 
and Cost 
competitiveness. 
 
 
Balance of 
Payments 
statistics, 
EUROSTAT. 
EUROSTAT 
 
Harmonised house 
price index by 
EUROSTAT, 
completed with 
ECB, OECD and 
BIS data. 
EUROSTAT for 
annual data and  
QSA, ECB for 
quarterly data. 
EUROSTAT for 
annual data and  
QSA, ECB for 
quarterly data. 
 
EUROSTAT 
(EDP – treaty 
definition). 
EUROSTAT 
Indicative 
thresholds 
 
+6/-4% 
 
 
-35% 
Lower quartile 
+/-5%  for €A 
+/-11%  non€A 
Lower  and Upper 
Quartiles of EA -
/+ s.d. of EA 
-6% 
Lower quartile 
+9% €A 
+12% non-€A 
Upper 
Quartile €A3 p.p 
+6% 
Upper quartile 
+15% 
Upper 
Quartile 
160% 
Upper 
Quartile 
+60%  +10% 
Period for  
calcu-
lating 
thresholds 
1970-2007 
First available 
year (mid-
1990s)-2007 
1995-2007 1995-2007  1995-2007  1995-2007  1994-2007   1994-2007 
Some 
additi-
onal 
indicators 
to be used 
in 
economic 
reading 
 
Net 
lending/borrow
ing vis-à-vis 
ROW (Capital 
Account + 
Current 
Account 
balances as % 
of GDP) 
Net External 
Debt as % 
GDP 
REER vis-à-vis 
rest of the euro 
area 
Export market 
shares based 
on volumes of 
goods; Labour 
productivity; 
Trend TFP 
growth 
Nominal ULCs 
(changes over 1, 
5, 10 years); 
Effective ULC 
relative to rest 
of euro-area 
Other measures 
of productivity 
Real house price  
(changes over 3 
years); 
Nominal house 
price (changes 
over 1 and 3 
years) 
Residential 
construction 
Indicator on 
change in 
financial 
liabilities of the 
non-
consolidated 
financial sector 
and the debt 
over equity ratio 
Private sector 
debt based on 
consolidated 
data 
  
Notes:  (a) for EU trading partners HICP is used while for non-EU trading partners, the deflator is based on a CPI close to the HICP in methodology; (b) index providing ratio of nominal 
compensation per employee to real GDP per person employed; (c) changes in house prices relative to the consumption deflator of EUROSTAT; (d) private sector is defined as non-
financial corporations; households and non-profit institutions serving households; (e) sum of Loans, and Securities other than shares; liabilities, non –consolidated; (f) the 
sustainability of public finances will not be assessed in the context of the MIP given that this issue is already covered by the SGP. However this indicator is part of the scoreboard    
because public indebtedness contributes to total indebtedness of the country and therefore to the overall vulnerability of the country. (*) It is envisaged to develop a wider indicator of 
the banking/financial sector by the end of 2012. 
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Table 2: The MIP scoreboard for 2010 
   External imbalances and competitiveness  Internal imbalances 
Year 2010 
3 year average of 
Current Account 
Balance as % of 
GDP  
Net Interna- 
tional Invest- 
ment Position as 
% of GDP 
% Change (3 years) 
of Real Effective 
Exchange Rate 
with HIPC 
deflators 
% Change (5 years) 
in Export Market 
Shares 
 % Change  
(3 years) in 
Nominal ULC 
% y-o-y change in 
deflated House 
Prices 
Private Sector 
Credit Flow as % 
of GDP 
Private Sector 
Debt as % of GDP
Public Sector Debt
as % of GDP 
3 year average of 
Unemployment 
Thresholds  -4/+6%  -35%  ±5% & ±11%  -6%  +9%  & +12% +6%   15%  160%  60%  10% 
BE -0.6  77.8  1.3  -15.4 8.5  0.4 13.1 233  96 7.7 
BG  -11.1  -97.7 10.4 15.8 27.8 -11.1 -0.2  169 16 7.5 
CZ -2.5  -49.0  12.7  12.3 5.1 -3.4 1.7  77  38  6.1 
DK  3.9 10.3 0.9 -15.3 11.0  0.5  5.8  244 43 5.6 
DE 5.9  38.4  -2.9  -8.3 6.6 -1.0 3.1 128 83 7.5 
EE -0.8  -72.8  5.9 -0.9 9.3 -2.1 -8.6 176 7 12.0 
IE -2.7  -90.9  -5.0  -12.8 -2.3 -10.5 -4.5  341  93  10.6 
EL  -12.1  -92.5 3.9 -20.0  12.8 -6.8 -0.7 124 145 9.9 
ES  -6.5  -89.5 0.6 -11.6  3.3 -3.8 1.4 227  61  16.5 
FR  -1.7 -10.0 -1.4 -19.4  7.2 5.1 2.4 160 82 9.0 
IT  -2.8 -23.9 -1.0 -19.0  7.8 -1.4 3.6 126 118 7.6 
CY  -12.1  -43.4 0.8 -19.4 7.2  -6.6 30.5  289  62 5.1 
LV -0.5  -80.2 8.5 14.0 -0.1 -3.9 -8.8 141  45 14.3 
LT -2.3  -55.9 9.1 13.9 0.8  -8.7 -5.3  81  38  12.5 
LU  6.4 96.5 1.9  3.2 17.3 3.0 -41.8  254 19 4.9 
HU -2.1  -112.5  -0.5 1.4 3.9 -6.7  -18.7  155 81 9.7 
MT  -5.4 9.2 -0.6 6.9 7.7 -1.6 6.9 212  69 6.6 
NL 5.0  28.0  -1.0  -8.1 7.4 -3.0 -0.7 223  63 3.8 
AT 3.5  -9.8  -1.3  -14.8  8.9 -1.5 6.4 166  72 4.3 
PL  -5.0  -64.0 -0.5 20.1 12.3 -6.1  3.8  74  55  8.3 
PT  -11.2  -107.5 -2.4  -8.6 5.1 0.1 3.3 249  93  10.4 
RO  -6.6  -64.2 -10.4 21.4  22.1 -12.1  1.7  78  31  6.6 
SI -3.0  -35.7 2.3  -5.9 15.7 0.7  1.8 129  39  5.9 
SK  -4.1  -66.2  12.1 32.6 10.1 -4.9  3.3  69  41  12.0 
FI 2.1  9.9  0.3  -18.7  12.3  6.8 6.8 178 48 7.7 
SE  7.5 -6.7 -2.5  -11.1 6.0  6.3 2.6 237 40 7.6 
UK -2.1  -23.8  -19.7  -24.3 11.3  3.4  3.3  212  80 7.0 
Note: (1) Cut-off date 30 January 2012; * Programme countries (IE, EL, PT, RO). LV ended its BoP assistance programme on 19 January 2012 but remains under post-
programme surveillance.   
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Table 3: Additional indicators used in the economic reading of the MIP scoreboard, 2010 
Year 
2010 
% y-o-y 
growth of 
real GDP
Gross fixed 
capital 
formation 
as % GDP
Gross 
domestic 
expenditure 
on R&D as 
% GDP 
Current 
Account 
balance as 
% of  GDP, 
BoP data 
Net 
lending / 
borrowing 
vs. ROW as 
% GDP, 
BoP data 
Net 
external 
debt as % 
GDP 
FDI 
Inflows as 
% GDP 
Net Trade 
Balance of 
energy 
products as 
% GDP 
% Change 
(3 years) in 
REER vs. 
EA (17) 
% y-o-y 
change in 
Export 
Market 
Shares, 
volumes 
% y-o-y 
growth of 
Labour 
Productivity
% y-o-y 
growth of 
Employ-
ment 
% Change 
(10 years) 
in Nominal 
ULC 
% Change 
(10 years) 
in Effective 
ULC vs. 
EA (17) 
% Change 
(3 years) in
Nominal 
house 
Prices 
Residential 
Construction 
as % GDP 
Private 
Sector Debt 
as % GDP, 
consolidated 
data 
Financial 
Liabilities 
of 
fin.sector, 
non-
consolidated 
y-o-y 
growth  
BE 2.3  20.2  2.0  1.5  1.3  -121.8  5.7  na  1.9  -5.6  1.4 0.8  22.5  4.0  6.3 na  130.6  -2.1 
BG 0.2  23.5  0.6  -1.3  -0.5  43.6  4.9  -5.9 :  3.9 6.4 -5.9  72.9 : -11.8  4.3  151.2  -2.2 
CZ 2.7  24.4  1.6  -3.1  -2.2  0.5  3.4  -3.5 :  3.0 4.5 -0.9  27.1 :  4.0 4.4 71.6  2.5 
DK  1.3  17.2 3.1 5.5 5.6  25.4  -2.4  1.1  : -10.4  3.6 -2.0  34.5  : -14.1 4.2 244.1  7.8 
DE  3.7 17.5 2.8  5.7  5.7 -5.8 1.4 -2.9 -1.4 -0.7  3.2  0.5  4.3  -16.7  3.6  5.3  111.8 0.0 
EE  2.3 18.8 1.6  3.6  7.2 24.1 8.1 -1.5 8.0 7.7  7.4  -4.1  73.8  42.4  -44.5 3.3  na -10.1 
IE  -0.4 11.5  1.8  0.5  0.1  -295.9  12.7  na  -5.2  -12.4  4.0  -4.2 28.7 9.4 -33.8  3.0  292.8 5.9 
EL  -3.5  16.6  na -10.1  -9.2 97.4 0.1 -4.2 5.1  -11.7 -1.7 -1.9  36.6  13.7 2.8  4.8  124.1 8.5 
ES  -0.1  22.9 1.4 -4.6 -4.0 91.7 1.8 -3.0 1.0 -6.8  2.6  -2.3  29.2 8.5 -9.9  7.5  213.9  -1.8 
FR  1.5  19.3 2.3 -1.7  -1.7  23.5  1.3  -2.4  -0.1  -6.0 1.4  0.2  22.6  3.7 0.0  6.1 137.4  2.9 
IT  1.5 19.7 1.3 -3.5 -3.5 51.3 0.4 -3.4 0.8 -4.7  2.3  -0.7  30.5  11.5 2.3  5.3  125.4 1.4 
CY 1.1  18.6  0.5  -9.9  -9.7  18.4  3.3 na 0.6  -5.8  1.1 0.0  32.8  9.2  -6.5 6.0  289.0  -7.6 
LV -0.3  19.5  0.6 3.0  4.9  53.5  1.6  -4.8 :  2.9 4.7 -3.7  86.0 : -46.8  2.0  135.8  -0.1 
LT  1.4  16.3  0.8 1.5  4.2  39.4  2.1  -7.2 :  2.5 6.9 -5.2  28.6 : -32.9  1.9 76.7  0.0 
LU  2.7 18.4 1.6  7.7  7.1  -3312.0  386.0 na  1.8  -18.8 0.8  1.7 37.5  16.6 5.0  3.4  201.6  10.0 
HU 1.3  18.0  1.2 1.1  2.9  60.3  1.4  -5.0 : -2.9 0.9 0.0  53.7 :  1.4 2.5  134.8  3.2 
MT  2.9 17.7 0.6  -3.9 -2.2  -176.2  12.8 na  3.6 -2.0  0.6  2.2 32.9  11.2 7.4  2.8  164.7  18.5 
NL  1.7 18.2  1.8  6.6  5.8 30.7 -1.7 -2.9 -0.9 -4.6  2.2  -0.3 24.2 6.8  -3.8  5.0  222.0 7.0 
AT  2.3 20.5 2.8  3.0  3.1 30.2 1.0 -3.0 0.2 -1.2  1.7  0.9 13.2  -2.8 5.6  4.2  149.7  -1.5 
PL 3.9  19.9  0.7  -4.6  -2.8  33.5  1.9  na :  -3.8  3.5  0.6  12.8  : na 2.6  71.1  13.5 
PT  1.4  19.8 1.6  -10.0  -8.9  84.4  0.6 na -2.1  -8.8 3.0 -1.5  24.9  4.8 6.3  3.8 224.4  10.2 
RO -1.6  24.0 0.5 -4.0  -3.7  38.3  1.8 -2.2  :  2.4  0.2 -1.8  225.5 :  na  na  76.7 4.5 
SI  1.4 21.6 2.1 -0.8 -0.8 31.7 0.8 -5.1 3.3 -2.3  4.0  -1.7  52.2  30.4  -2.6  3.2  118.4  -3.4 
SK  4.2 22.2  0.6  -3.5 -1.9 23.9 0.6  na 12.8 2.4  5.7  -2.0 33.9  15.7 -1.2  2.7  69.0  1.6 
FI  3.6 18.8 3.9  1.8  1.9 28.5 2.9 -2.9 2.1 -8.0  5.1  -1.5  21.8 3.2  8.9  6.5  155.0  19.0 
SE 5.6  17.8  3.4  6.7  6.5  62.3  -0.3  -1.7  :  -0.7  4.4  1.1  15.6  :  13.3  3.2  221.0  2.1 
UK 2.1  14.9  1.8  -3.3  -3.1  46.3  2.2 na  : -5.7 1.9 0.3  30.0 : -2.1 3.1  na 8.0 
Note: (1) 'na' refers to data not available for the moment. (2) Cut-off date is 30 January 2012; * Programme countries (IE, EL, PT, RO). LV ended its BoP assistance 
programme on 19 January 2012.     
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2. THE DESIGN OF THE SCOREBOARD  
The scoreboard has been established by the Commission in line with Article 4 of the 
Regulation
3 and after taking on board comments
4 from the European Parliament
5, the 
Council
6 as well as from the European Systemic Risk Board as regards financial market 
stability related issues
7. The scoreboard indicators (see table 1) are publicly available
8.  
When selecting the indicators and thresholds for this first edition of the scoreboard, the 
Commission has followed the guiding principles provided by the legislation. The scoreboard 
contains a small number of relevant, practical, simple, measurable, and available indicators. 
EUROSTAT sources are used when available, else the highest quality alternative data source 
has been chosen (e.g. the ECB). The selection of indicators is intended to allow for the early 
identification of imbalances that emerge over both the short-term as well as imbalances that 
arise due to structural and long-term trends. To this end the choice of indicators focuses on 
the most relevant dimensions of macroeconomic imbalances and competitiveness losses, with 
a particular emphasis on the smooth functioning of the euro area. It should be underlined that 
the surveillance of public debt is limited to its contribution to macroeconomic imbalances as 
the sustainability of public finances is already covered by the Stability and Growth Pact
9.  
Indicative thresholds have been set at prudent levels a view to avoid excessive numbers of 
'false alarms' but which are not set so stringently that they only identify problems once they 
are entrenched. Table 2 shows the values of the scoreboard indicators. They are based on data 
until 2010 which is the last complete year with data currently available. The shaded areas 
mark where the indicator value surpasses the identified indicative thresholds. These 
thresholds are the same for all countries (except for indicators on Real Effective Exchange 
Rates and Unit Labour Costs where a differentiation has been made between euro-area and 
non-euro-area countries). Moreover, the assessment also takes into account the most recent 
data as well as the economic outlook in the Commission's Autumn forecast published on 10 
November 2011. Values of indicators for previous years and the most recent period are 
reported in the accompanying Statistical Annex
10. 
The assessment of imbalances does not derive from a mechanical application of the 
scoreboard indicators and the related thresholds. It is the outcome of an economic reading of 
the scoreboard complemented by additional information and indicators taking due account of 
country-specific circumstances and institutions. In its Resolution
11, the European Parliament 
highlighted the need to adopt a comprehensive approach reflecting the productivity drivers 
                                                 
3  Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances. 
4  The Commission Staff Working Paper including the proposal for the envisaged scoreboard on which the 
consultation took place can be found at: WEBLINK. Moreover, the Commission will publish a background 
paper with additional evidence on the rationale and properties of the chosen indicators. 
5  Resolution of the European Parliament adopted on 15 December 2011:   
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/economy_finance/index_en.htm 
6  Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council of 8 November 2011;   
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/125976.pdf 
7  The views of the ESRB on the envisaged scoreboard indicators relevant for financial market stability: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/economy_finance/index_en.htm 
8 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/economy_finance/index_en.htm 
9  Moreover, the indicator on the evolution of unemployment is read in conjunction with other, more forward-
looking, scoreboard indicators and is used to better understand the potential severity of macroeconomic 
imbalances in terms of their likely persistence and the capacity of the economy to adjust. 
10 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/economy_finance/index_en.htm 
11  See footnote 7.  
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and the unemployment trends. The European Parliament also recommended giving full 
consideration to spill over effects in the scoreboard analysis. To this end, and in line with the 
regulation, additional indicators are considered and which are presented in Table 3. This inter 
alia includes additional aspects linked to the general macroeconomic situation (including 
growth conditions and investments) nominal and real convergence inside and outside the euro 
area including additional aspects of trade performance and specificities of catching-up 
economies (including FDI and net external debt indicators). They also reflect the potential for 
the development of imbalances as well as the adjustment capacity of an economy such as 
productivity. As recommended by the Council, the European Parliament and the ESRB in 
their comments on the Commission proposal for the scoreboard, it also includes the state of 
financial markets, which played an important role in the current crisis
12. This set of additional 
indicators is an integral part of the economic reading of the scoreboard and the related 
selection of Member States for which further investigation through in-depth reviews appears 
warranted. 
3. A THEMATIC READING OF THE SCOREBOARD 
Current account divergences have narrowed but not disappeared with the crises… 
The large contraction in economic activity during the crisis resulted in a significant reduction 
in external imbalances. In particular, Member States which entered the recession with large 
current account deficits have experienced pronounced corrections on the back of a sharper 
drop in private sector demand and a corresponding contraction in imports. At the same time, 
several Member States with large current account surpluses have recently been experiencing 
relatively more resilient, albeit not very dynamic, private sector demand and/or their exports 
have been held back by the slump in world demand, which contributed to some reductions in 
current account surpluses. 
Nevertheless, high current account deficits and surpluses have not vanished altogether. The 
scoreboard indicator on the current account balance (3-year average of current account 
balances as a % of GDP) still indicates deficits exceeding the indicative threshold of 4% of 
GDP in Bulgaria, Spain, Cyprus, Malta, Poland and Slovakia, even though in some of these 
Member States the current account deficit has continued declining in the most recent period. 
The potential vulnerability from external deficits can be reduced if these are financed through 
relatively safe means such as FDI or capital transfers. FDI inflows were high before the crisis 
in many of the catching-up Member States: over the last five years, for example, FDI inflows 
covered more than half of current account deficits in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Malta and Slovakia. Similarly, the positive balance on the capital account, where the capital 
transfers from abroad are typically recorded, has been non-negligible in a majority of 
catching-up Member States
13.  
                                                 
12  It should be noted that some of the scoreboard indicators, notably on credit developments and house prices, 
also reflect this aspect. It is envisaged to develop an indicator on banking/financial sector by the end of 2012 
to be included in the scoreboard of the and in time for the subsequent European semester. 
13  These transfers also include capital inflows from EU structural funds. In the cases of Slovakia and Poland, 
including the capital account balance would actually bring the indicator value inside the limits of the 
indicative thresholds. Also Greece, Spain and Portugal benefited from strong inflows from EU structural 
funds.   
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On the other hand, some Member States continue to record persistent current account 
surpluses: Luxembourg and Sweden exceed the indicative threshold of 6%, while Germany 
and the Netherlands are just below it.  
The Commission's 2011 autumn forecast points to some further narrowing of current account 
positions over next two years, although the reductions in deficits are likely to be mild in most 
cases, while in the Netherlands, for example, surpluses are set to increase (see graph 1). 
On the way forward, a key issue is whether current account imbalances will stay moderate or 
increase again once conditions in markets improve. Some of the past imbalances were driven 
by excessive demand growth fuelled by overly optimistic expectations about future income 
growth in some Member States. To the extent the recent corrections reflect reassessment of 
such expectations rather than purely cyclical drops in output, they could prove sustainable. On 
the other hand, adjustments in relative prices have been limited in most cases, which 
eventually leaves the question about the structural nature of these realignments and hence 
their sustainability open. 
Graph 1: Current account balances as % of GDP 
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Source: European Commission. 
…and the stocks of net external liabilities remain substantial in many cases. 
The net international investment positions (NIIP)
14 as a share of GDP have stayed at high 
negative levels in many current account deficit countries. This is due to persistent, although 
lower, current account deficits and also weak growth dynamics. Currently, the NIIP positions 
exceed the indicative threshold of -35% in a number of Member States: Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Spain, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Poland, and by small margin 
in Slovenia. The degree of vulnerability is lower if the share of liabilities that require 
repayment of principal or interest, such as loans or portfolio debt, is low. An indicator of net 
                                                 
14  Net International Investment Position statistics record the net financial position (liabilities minus assets) of a 
country vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Data cover stocks of direct and portfolio investments, financial 
derivatives and other investment and reserve assets.  
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external debt
15 (NED, see table 3) shows that such liabilities are relatively low in many 
catching-up Member States, largely due to the high levels of FDI stocks. On the other hand, 
they are rather high in Spain, Hungary, Lithuania and Latvia. 
The pre-crisis developments in external positions coincided with price competitiveness 
divergences …  
Member States with high and persistent current account deficits accumulated losses in 
measures of price and cost competitiveness in the years preceding the crisis. Wage growth 
tended to outstrip productivity improvements in many EU countries, inducing increases in 
unit labour costs (ULC). Similarly, the developments in real effective exchange rates (REER), 
which show price competitiveness relative to the main trading partners, painted a picture of 
increasing divergence. This may signal overheating, potential structural rigidities in product 
and labour markets and/or inappropriate responses of wages to country-specific shocks, but 
could also reflect a catching-up process in some Member States. In a number of Member 
States with high external deficits, the increases in labour costs were concentrated, although 
not exclusively, in the non-tradable sectors. This, in turn, induced a reallocation of resources 
towards these sectors, exerting further pressure on external positions. 
The crisis has interrupted these developments and initiated adjustment
16. The scoreboard 
indicator (3-year change in the ULC index), nonetheless, shows that a number Member States 
still exceeded the indicative thresholds over the years 2008-2010 (9% for euro-area members 
and 12% for non-euro-area ones)
17, namely Bulgaria, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovenia, 
Slovakia and Finland. The indicator of REER developments (based on HICP deflators and 
showing 3-year percentage change) also shows interruptions or reversals of the pre-crisis 
trends. In Member States which exceed the indicative thresholds, the developments were 
mainly driven by changes in nominal exchange rates. This is true for Slovakia (before its 
entry in the euro area) and the Czech Republic which experienced sharp appreciations of their 
currencies. The UK experienced a significant depreciation. Conversely, Estonia's appreciation 
of its REER was largely driven by higher inflation compared to its trading partners, mainly 
due to a higher responsiveness of domestic inflation to increases in global commodity prices 
as well as to higher administered prices increases. Notwithstanding the often sizeable 
reversals, the long-run price competitiveness losses have not been fully corrected in most 
Member States. Further realignments in relative prices and improvements in competitiveness 
would facilitate the needed sectoral reallocation and contribute to the sustainability of the 
external adjustment. 
                                                 
15  Net External Debt shows the net position of a country vis-à-vis the rest of the world as regards liabilities that 
require payments of principal and/or interest by the debtor at some point in the future. NED can be derived 
from the NIIP by excluding non-debt external liabilities (e.g. equity). 
16  In 2009, ULC growth accelerated because the large drops in productivity, due to output losses and labour 
hoarding, exceeded the often significant wage corrections. However, average growth of ULCs slowed down 
significantly in 2010 and has been moderate in 2011.  
17  In the scoreboard indicative thresholds can be differentiated between euro area and non-euro area Member 
States economically justified. As regards the ULC, the rationale for this differentiation is that the majority of 
non-euro area Member States, i.e. those who acceded in 2004 and later, have experienced trade 
liberalisations since early 1990s which has entailed a natural process of factor price convergence implying 
relatively stronger labour cost growth.  
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…while the EU as a whole has lost global export market shares, some Member States have 
lost more than others.    
Changes in world export market shares of goods and services (percentage change over five 
years) point to potentially important structural losses in overall competitiveness in the global 
economy in a number of Member States. Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, 
Cyprus, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Sweden and the UK have sustained market share 
loses exceeding the 6% indicative threshold. In a number of these countries, the losses in 
export market shares are even more pronounced if a longer time period is considered (see 
graph 2). In addition to losses in price/cost competitiveness, this may also reflect sluggish 
improvements in non-price competitiveness, low ability to exploit new sales opportunities or 
the diversion of resources to the non-tradable sector during domestic absorption booms. In 
many cases, these reductions in global export market shares are largely due to the fact that 
exports of these Member States grew at a lower pace than the world trade – the export share 
of the EU as a whole has declined. However, export performance of Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Italy, Cyprus, Austria, Finland and the UK has also been less dynamic compared to 
other EU countries as witnessed by the declining shares of their exports in total exports of all 
EU Member States (see graph 2)
18. 
Graph 2: Percentage changes in export market shares. 
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Indebtedness weighs on households and corporations 
The prolonged period of credit expansion prior to the crisis has left economic agents in many 
Member States with large levels of accumulated debt (see graph 3). This process partially 
reflected enhanced financial market integration and deepening, altogether with convergence in 
nominal interest rates. Moreover, rapid credit growth was also fuelled by other factors, such 
as misalignments in assets prices, exacerbated by favourable asset taxation and lending 
standards as confirmed by a generalised increase in the share of loans for house purchases 
over total loans in the run-up to the crisis. The indebtedness of the private sector as a whole 
exceeds the indicative threshold of 160% in more than a dozen Member States: Belgium, 
                                                 
18  These conclusions seem to broadly hold also when looking at the change in export market shares based on 
volumes of goods trade.  
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Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, 
Finland, Sweden and the UK. A high level of private sector debt increases the exposure of the 
private sector to changes in the business cycle, inflation and interest rates. Moreover, the 
unwinding of excessively leveraged positions jeopardises growth and financial stability. At a 
disaggregated level, non-financial corporations were the primary drivers behind debt 
accumulation in Belgium, Spain, Cyprus, Slovenia and Sweden. While the ability of firms to 
repay their debt (debt over GDP or value added) can serve as a starting point for the analysis 
of corporate indebtedness, a closer look at the share of assets that are financed by debt and 
their maturity structure will qualify the actual needs for deleveraging as well as its speed. 
Furthermore, the household sector was largely responsible for the rise in leverage in 
Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK, with the household debt level exceeding their GDP 
levels. These developments came hand in hand with cumulated increases in house prices 
above 150% over the last cycle (only matched by house price hikes in Spain and Ireland). 
Price increases in housing markets reached unprecedented levels.  
Household indebtedness is closely linked with housing market developments: growth in credit 
to households and house price increases went hand in hand during the decade preceding the 
crisis. The house price cycle in the EU was particularly pronounced, with an average 
cumulated growth in prices of over 40%. For example, house prices more than doubled during 
the period of upswing in a half of the Member States. Moreover, in around two-thirds of 
Member States, the average pace of real house price increases exceeded 6% annually and in 
some cases the average annual growth rates were as high as 20% to 35%. While the length 
and the speed of this expansion has shown significant variations across countries, house prices 
peaked in a vast majority of Member States in 2007/2008. Expectations of continued house 
price increases also facilitated increases in size of the construction sector. Indeed, high 
residential investment went hand in hand with the increase in house prices for many Member 
States, like Denmark, Spain, Lithuania, Malta, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
… but adjustment is underway although it is unclear how far it will go and for how long it 
will continue. 
A correction is now underway: real house price increases were below the indicative threshold 
of 6% in all Member States but Finland and Sweden in 2010. Recent adjustments have been 
rather significant and countries that experienced the highest and fastest increases in prices 
before the crises have tended to show, albeit not in all cases, the most pronounced corrections, 
signalling the existence of pre-crisis overvaluation. For example, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, 
Spain, Lithuania, Latvia and Slovakia went through a significant adjustment following large 
accumulated real house prices rises. Notwithstanding these corrections, there might still be 
scope for further retrenchment in several countries which also experienced large and fast 
house price increases, such as Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovenia, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom, as there is typically a direct link between the strength of the correction 
phase and the amplitude of the boom phase of the house price cycle. In addition, worsening 
credit conditions and weak GDP growth are likely to weigh on housing prices developments 
in the near future. Supply conditions will prove an important factor as well. 
Deleveraging has started … 
More generally, the supply of credit to the private sector slowed down drastically in some 
Member States and the deleveraging process has begun. The data on private credit flows show 
that the adjustment started in 2009, following a still-buoyant credit expansion in 2008. In  
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2010, credit growth exceeded the indicative threshold of 15% only in Cyprus. Slow credit 
growth combined with increased net savings may have a negative feed-back effect on GDP 
growth through a constrained internal demand. Empirical evidence shows that crisis-induced 
balance sheet adjustments in the private sector last on average more than five years, and even 
longer in the non-financial corporate sector. In this context, net exports and productivity 
developments are important as essential drivers of economic growth. 
… making the EU economies more vulnerable. 
In the course of the financial crisis, it has become clear that the overall indebtedness of a 
Member State is important and that there are strong linkages between private sector and 
general government debt
19. Therefore, private sector debt needs to be considered together 
with general government debt because the impact of deleveraging in the private sector could 
be magnified by the on-going sovereign debt crisis exerting pressure on highly-indebted 
public sectors. This could particularly be the case for Member States characterised by highly 
indebted public and private sectors, e.g. Belgium
20 or the UK (see graph 3). While private 
sector indebtedness is not excessive in Italy, the high level of public debt and the need to 
consolidate public finances could exert pressures on private sector balance sheets. Elevated 
amounts of debt in the hands of non-residents can prove to be an additional concern in a 
context of high uncertainty in international financial markets as they increase the vulnerability 
of a country to shortages of capital or sudden stops in capital inflows. As regards external 
indebtedness, Spain and Hungary in particular feature a combination of high private and net 
external debt. Moreover, when denominated in a foreign currency, debt may raise additional 
vulnerability concerns arising from exchange rate fluctuations.  
Graph 3: Levels of accumulated debt by sector as % of GDP (2010) 
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19  Governments have taken on large contingent liabilities from the private sector which, even if they do not 
immediately impact on debt levels, may affect their perceived creditworthiness. There are also feedback 
effects from the private sector to the government sector, as private sector actors (not only financial 
institutions) may become large creditors to sovereigns, making them vulnerable to fiscal woes.  
20  Although the private sector debt based on consolidated figures is lower in Belgium due to a high share of 
intra-company loans.  
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The adjustment in the real economy is ongoing  
The adjustment of external imbalances and the repair of household and corporate balance 
sheets have been rather painful, particularly in Member States which experienced large 
imbalances prior to the crisis. This adjustment has been largely driven by developments in 
domestic demand, and has often been associated with a significant rise in unemployment 
levels. This may reflect limited price/wage adjustment but could also reflect the ongoing 
process of sectoral reallocation. The adjustment to macroeconomic imbalances often requires 
shifts of labour and capital across different sectors in the economy, in particular from 
artificially inflated real estate sectors to tradable sectors. This process is usually gradual 
(given the different skill requirements of the sectors concerned) and has still some way to go. 
Unemployment levels have been high over the past years and the scoreboard indicator (3-year 
average of unemployment rate) is above the indicative threshold of 10% in Estonia, Spain, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia. Also in many other Member States, this indicator pointed to 
rather high levels of unemployment, which, moreover, have generally followed an upward 
trend. The structural unemployment rate has been affected considerably by the recent 
recession. The reallocation of labour across the sectors in the economy has been sluggish in 
most Member States and the resulting high levels of unemployment involve potentially large 
losses in human capital and overall efficiency. Moreover, unemployment prospects are likely 
to be affected by the current uncertainty and fading growth momentum, the scope for sectoral 
reallocation in the economy and the ongoing deleveraging process in many Member States.  
The adjustment is bound to be more challenging in the low productivity growth environment. 
The declining trend in productivity contributed to the accumulation of macroeconomic 
imbalances and competitiveness losses in the pre-crisis period in a number of Member States. 
At the same time, achieving the necessary adjustment in labour costs and relative prices is 
easier when productivity is increasing at a sustained pace as this reduces the pressure on 
changes in nominal wages and prices. 
4. COUNTRY-SPECIFIC COMMENTARIES ON THE READING OF THE SCOREBOARD 
The commentaries below do not cover Member States which are subject to surveillance under 
programmes. This concerns Greece, Ireland and Portugal in the euro-area and Romania 
outside the euro area. 
Belgium: the value of scoreboard indicators for the change in export market shares, gross 
private sector debt and public sector debt are above the indicative thresholds. With respect to 
external competitiveness, there has been a loss in export market shares, going hand in hand 
with a deterioration in the current account balance even if the level remains below the 
indicative threshold and the deteriorating goods balance is partly being offset by the services 
balance performing well. These trends may be explained by declining cost competitiveness 
due to, inter alia, ULC increases that are higher than those of the euro area, but also to non-
cost competitiveness. On the internal side, the private sector debt indicator is well above the 
relevant threshold. There are qualifications to take into account, including the impact of 
intercompany loans on non-financial corporate debt and that household debt is mostly 
mortgage related while the household savings rate remains high. Notwithstanding this, the 
level of gross private sector debt should be seen in conjunction with high levels of public 
debt.   
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Bulgaria: prior to the crisis, Bulgaria recorded large current account deficits, which has led to 
a NIIP in deficit, driven by capital inflows (mostly in the form of FDI) and private credit 
growth. The crisis resulted in a sharp correction of the current account deficit which is now 
projected to turn into a slight surplus in 2011 and subsequent years. The improvement came 
not only from reduced imports but also from a strong export performance in a catching-up 
context. Bulgaria shows one of the highest rises in ULC in the EU although the wage 
increases, from very low base level, are part of the ongoing convergence process but could 
slow the catching-up process over the medium and longer run. Private sector indebtedness has 
increased rapidly to levels above the indicative threshold mainly explained by increases in 
corporate debt while household debt remains limited as does public sector debt. 
Czech Republic: current account deficits, albeit below the threshold, have been recorded 
over the last decade though some narrowing can be observed in recent years, driven largely by 
an improving trade balance. As a result NIIP surpassed the indicative threshold, although 
recent unfavourable valuation effects on the stocks of assets and liabilities should be 
acknowledged. Due to the predominant FDI financing and relatively contained private and 
public sector debt, the net external debt has remained close to zero. Despite losses in price 
competitiveness through strong REER appreciation and growth in ULCs, there have been 
gains in export market shares.  
Denmark: the current account is recording continuous surpluses mainly thanks to strong 
services exports, revenues from oil and gas exports, and earnings on foreign investment. 
There have however been losses of export performance over the past years as witnessed by 
the indicator of export market shares being above the threshold. Moreover, Denmark price 
competitiveness has deteriorated somewhat due to high nominal wage agreements in a period 
of overheating and weak productivity growth. The Danish housing boom, which started to be 
corrected in 2007, was associated with rapid credit growth and a surge of private sector debt, 
in particular in the household sector. While credit and house prices have partially adjusted in 
recent years, the stock of private sector debt remains very high and above the indicative 
threshold although for households this partly reflects elevated contributions to private pension 
saving schemes and a generous safety net.  
Germany: across the last decade Germany recorded persistent current account surpluses. This 
reflects in part an export performance coinciding with regained price competitiveness, and in 
part subdued domestic investment and relatively high household saving rates. However, in 
recent years, domestic demand has been slowly strengthening, supporting a gradual narrowing 
of the current account surplus, and can be seen as part of rebalancing. Further, while a loss of 
export market shares of goods has been recorded, this development is less marked than for the 
euro area average. On the internal side, private sector indebtedness is relatively contained 
while the indicator for general government debt exceeds the indicative threshold but it is 
projected to diminish in 2011 and the phasing in of the constitutional debt brake should 
underpin a trend decline. 
Estonia: in the last decade, Estonia consistently recorded current account deficits, until a 
marked correction took place during the crisis; in the same period, it achieved large gains in 
export market shares, despite losses in price competitiveness (from a low initial price level). 
In recent years, there has been wage and cost adjustment. Overall, there has also been a 
gradual build up of a negative NIIP and it remains above the indicative threshold: however, 
this to a large extent reflects FDI implying that net external debt is substantially lower. Private 
sector indebtedness is above the indicative threshold, although the deleveraging process is 
strong. In combination with high nominal GDP growth the private sector debt ratio is set to  
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fall. Unemployment is high but adjusting quickly downwards reflecting high labour market 
flexibility. 
Spain: the economy is currently going through an adjustment period, following the build-up 
of large external and internal imbalances during the extended housing and credit boom in the 
years prior to the crisis. The current account has shown significant deficits, which have started 
to decrease recently in the context of the severe economic slowdown and on the back of an 
improving export performance, but remain above the indicative threshold. Since 2008 losses 
in price and cost competitiveness have partially reversed. While the adjustment of imbalances 
is on-going, the absorption of the large stocks of internal and external debt and the 
reallocation of the resources freed from the construction sector will take time to restore more 
balanced conditions. The contraction in employment linked to the downsizing of the 
construction sector and the economic recession has been aggravated by a sluggish adjustment 
of wages, fuelling rising unemployment.  
France: an economic reading of the scoreboard points to issues on both the external and 
internal sides. The contraction of France's market share in world exports is above the 
indicative threshold, and this decline is amongst the largest in the EU. There is a gradual 
deterioration of the trade balance, and this is reflected in a deterioration of the current account 
balance even if still below the indicative threshold. Concerns about the external position of 
the French economy are also fuelled by some losses in both price and non-price 
competiveness. In this context, the reduction in profitability of French companies and the 
implications for investments are relevant factors that deserve further analysis. The level of 
private sector indebtedness has gradually increased to reach the indicative threshold level, and 
this has occurred alongside higher levels of public sector debt. 
Italy: scoreboard values are above the indicative thresholds in the areas of competitiveness 
and public debt. Italy has had a significant deterioration in competitiveness since the mid-
1990s which is also seen through the persistent losses of market shares. These losses are only 
partly reflected in the steady worsening of Italy's external position, given the relatively 
subdued growth of domestic demand. Weak productivity developments are the main 
explanatory factor. While private sector indebtedness is relatively contained in Italy, largely 
thanks to the financial position of households, the level of public debt is a concern, especially 
given the weak growth performance and structural weaknesses. This, in turn, potentially puts 
strain on private sector balance sheets. 
Cyprus: with the values of many indicators above indicative thresholds an economic reading 
of the scoreboard points to wide-ranging challenges as regards both the external and internal 
side. The Cypriot economy has been characterised by persistent current account deficits over 
the past decade mainly driven by buoyant domestic demand. The evolution of the Cypriot 
current account shows large disparities in the trade of goods and services reflecting a shift of 
the Cypriot economy towards the tertiary sector. The negative trade balance in goods is only 
partly compensated by the surplus recorded in services trade. Cyprus recorded price 
competitiveness losses in the years ahead of the crises but this trend has been more contained 
in latter years. The highly leveraged private sector has continued to unwind its large level of 
outstanding debt, which nevertheless coexists with substantial assets. The deterioration of the 
economic outlook and the fiscal situation as well as the implications from the exposure of the 
banking sector to Greece add to concerns on the challenges involved in adjusting to 
imbalances in other sectors of the economy.  
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Latvia: until 2008, Latvia recorded large and sustained current account deficits coupled with 
a rapid growth of a negative NIIP even though net external debt is lower taking FDI into 
account. The crisis brought a marked hard landing with an immediate and abrupt correction of 
the current account deficit requiring a strong adjustment programme supported by balance of 
payment assistance which is about to end in January 2012. The previous trend of continuous 
losses of price competitiveness has been compensated by internal adjustment including wage 
and employment cuts. The boom years were also characterised by strong credit growth, 
booming house prices and construction. This implied a rapid build up of private sector debt 
leading to a process of deleveraging and a substantial adjustment of house prices in the bust 
period. While unemployment is still high, it fell quickly from its peak in late 2009. 
Lithuania: until 2008 Lithuania recorded large current account deficits as well as losses of 
price competitiveness, reflecting a domestic boom. As a result of a marked and significant 
adjustment process during the crisis years, the current account is now at levels closer to 
balance. The REER has depreciated, mostly as a result of nominal wage declines. Even before 
2008 Lithuania was able to gain export market shares from a low level. While the NIIP 
remains negative and at high levels above the indicative threshold, net external debt is much 
lower taking financing through FDI into account. The financial crisis brought to an end the 
expansion of the banking sector and robust wage dynamics, private sector started to 
deleverage, credit flows as a percentage of GDP turned negative and house prices have 
corrected significantly. While unemployment is still high, it is falling from its peak in 2010. 
Luxembourg: the value of the scoreboard indicator for the current account balance is above 
the threshold, caused by trade surpluses reflecting the country's strong specialisation in 
financial services. This, however, is not related to subdued domestic demand, but 
concentration of economic activities and jobs in the country. Luxembourg has lost price 
competitiveness as a result of high wage increases and low productivity growth, but it should 
be noted that at the same time Luxembourg is gaining export market shares in services. 
Private sector indebtedness is above the indicative threshold, coupled with large and volatile 
credit flows. This is mainly explained by lending and borrowing operations inside 
international non-financial corporations, rather than an excessive indebtedness of the private 
sector. The household debt level is relatively contained. Real house prices witnessed large 
cumulated growth during the last decade and the correction is limited so far.  
Hungary: the values of scoreboard indicators for the public debt ratio and NIIP are well 
above the indicative thresholds. The latter is the result of the continuous current account 
deficits recorded in the years before the crisis. With the crisis a sharp adjustment has taken 
place as domestic demand collapsed but the NIIP deficit remains large even if a substantial 
part is financed by FDI. The pre-crises period also saw very strong credit growth, which in 
particular for households has been largely financed in foreign currency. The accumulation of 
external financial exposure in the private sector has taken place in a context of high and 
increasing public debt levels also financed in foreign currency. In November 2011, the 
government formally requested precautionary financial assistance from the EU and the IMF
21.  
Malta: the economy experienced persistent current account deficits over the past decade but 
they have narrowed in recent years and Malta has a positive NIIP. It remains to be seen 
whether the narrowing of the external deficit is of a structural nature or not. Past export 
market share losses reflect the decline in traditional manufacturing activities but are being 
                                                 
21  Formal negotiations have not yet started.  
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reversed by the services sector. On the domestic side, house prices have risen significantly but 
now appear to be on a downward path.  
Netherlands: in the years leading up to the crisis, the Netherlands recorded persistent large 
current account surpluses, mainly driven by the trade balance, including the impact from 
positive net gas exports. The levels are however currently below the threshold even though 
they will increase in coming years according to the Commission forecast. Despite some rise in 
nominal unit labour costs, the losses in export market shares has been contained. The 
surpluses also reflect high saving in the corporate sector coupled with subdued investment. 
Internal risks to the economy in the Netherlands mainly relate to the relatively high private 
sector debt and real estate markets. In the years before the crisis, household debt relative to 
disposable income and house prices increased, partly related to fiscal incentives for 
households to take up large mortgages. At the same time, the net financial asset position of 
households is positive.  
Austria: as regards the external performance Austria has recorded sustained current account 
surpluses. At the same time the indicator for export market shares point to losses although 
ULC growth has been contained Private sector debt levels have gradually been rising and are 
currently somewhat above the indicative threshold as is also public sector debt. However, 
Austria did not, in relative terms, experience a domestic housing, asset or credit boom in the 
late 2000s and the increase of indebtedness has been primarily driven by corporations. Recent 
developments for 2011 suggest that the rise in private indebtedness has come to a halt and that 
the private sector, including nonfinancial corporations, will be in a net lending position.  
Poland: although the values of scoreboard indicators for the current account balance and 
NIIP are above the indicative thresholds, these need to seen in the context of a catching-up 
process and were largely financed through relatively stable FDI and EU funds inflows. There 
have been limited losses in price competitiveness in 2006-2008 driven by nominal exchange 
rate appreciation, but since 2009 the trend reversed. Despite these losses Poland experienced 
large gains in export market shares and limited increases in nominal ULC. There has been 
relatively strong credit growth and build up of private sector debt, albeit from a low level, but 
partially financed in foreign currency.  
Slovenia: two indicators in the scoreboard exceed the threshold in 2010. In the years before 
the crisis, Slovenia enjoyed strong growth and domestic demand conditions, coupled with 
some losses in price competitiveness and a gradual widening of the current account deficit. 
There are signs that overheating occurred, particularly as regards private sector credit growth, 
construction value added and property prices. The Slovenian economy was hit hard by the 
global crisis. This has brought some, perhaps temporary, adjustment in the external balance 
but this is still at an early stage. The high indebtedness of non-financial corporations, 
including in the construction sector, is reflected in corporate bankruptcies, loan-to-equity 
ratios and loan arrears.  
Slovakia: the current account for Slovakia recorded large and sustained deficits during the 
last decade, partially financed through capital transfers from abroad. Nevertheless, the current 
account indicator remains above the indicative threshold although marginally. Foreign direct 
investment, which was largely directed to productive export-oriented industries, accounted for 
a dominant share of the gradually deteriorating net international investment position. Loss in 
price competitiveness reflected in a value of the REER indicator that is above the indicative 
threshold is mainly due to a strong nominal appreciation, and came together with high growth  
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in productivity, exports and world shares of trade. Overall, public as well as private sector 
indebtedness levels remain low.  
Finland: several scoreboard indicators relating to external positions, such as export market 
share losses, are above the indicative thresholds. The current account is in surplus, although 
declining, over the last decade reflecting the global slowdown but also structural changes in 
the export sectors. Moreover, while losses in price competitiveness were relatively contained 
over most of the past decade, in recent years there have been some sharper losses due to slow 
adjustment of wages in a context of falling productivity. The scoreboard also points to a 
steady increase in the level of private sector indebtedness during the last decade which is now 
above the indicative threshold, driven to a large extent driven by increasing mortgages. House 
prices increased over the last decade despite some moderate correction over 2008-2009. In 
2010 prices started to pick-up again, and at a pace above the indicative threshold, although 
prices have moderated since the second half of 2011.  
Sweden: there has been a record of persistently large current account surpluses, above the 
indicative threshold. This reflects positive private and public sector saving positions on the 
one hand but also to some extent subdued domestic investment, in particular in the 
construction sector.  Indicators of cost developments such as unit labour costs and real 
effective exchange rates do not point to a loss in price competitiveness. At the internal side 
Sweden shows a very high level of private sector debt well above the indicative threshold. 
There has been increasing household indebtedness, which is now at high levels despite recent 
slower credit growth. This reflects very strong increase in house prices over the last fifteen 
years which have started to stabilise only recently.  
UK: the UK has lost export market shares over the last decade, with the indicator being above 
the threshold, although some stabilisation can be noted in recent years. This loss of market 
shares has taken place despite a substantial depreciation of the REER in recent years. At the 
same time, the UK recorded current account deficits albeit below the indicative threshold. The 
high level of private debt is a concern also in a context of a weak public finance situation with 
high and increasing public debt. The household debt largely reflects mortgages in a context of 
high accumulated increases in house prices. While both the level of household debt and real 
house prices has been reduced, they still remain high which suggests that the unwinding of 
these imbalances has further to go where the speed of adjustment is an important aspect.  
5. MAIN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS  
This first implementation of the macroeconomic imbalances procedure takes place against the 
background of a problematic economic environment dominated by concerns about sovereign 
debt. All Member States are adjusting to the impact of the crisis, although their individual 
challenges differ in terms of scope and severity. As the Commission's recent Annual Growth 
Survey
22 explains, in addition to correcting significant imbalances that built up over previous 
years, the Union and Member States are also dealing with the interrelated challenges of 
tackling low growth and high unemployment, ensuring sustainable public finances and 
restoring stability to the financial system. The objective to reduce imbalances is also 
recognised in the context of the G20 where a surveillance process to promote an orderly 
rebalancing of global growth conditions has been put in place.  
                                                 
22 http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/news/documents/pdf/ags_en.pdf    
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An adjustment of macroeconomic imbalances is underway in many Member States, especially 
those which have/had high external deficits and large imbalances in household and/or 
corporate balance sheets and in their public sectors. This process still has some way to go, and 
has led in a number of Member States to a significant rise in unemployment levels and a 
reduction in the level of economic activity in the short term. As highlighted in the Annual 
Growth Survey, reforms promoting productivity growth will have particular relevance for 
Member States suffering from macroeconomic imbalances due to their positive impact on 
potential output and adjustment capacity
23. In the current environment, the risks of new 
demand-led imbalances emerging are generally low, although pressures on asset markets 
could re-emerge once growth resumes.  
Given that programme countries are already under enhanced economic surveillance of their 
economic situation and policies, they are not examined under the macroeconomic imbalances 
procedure.
24 This concerns Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Romania. Latvia is under post-
programme surveillance as the balance of payment assistance programme expired on 19 
January 2012 and is therefore examined in this report. 
On the basis of the economic reading of the scoreboard, the Commission considers that 
further in-depth analysis is warranted to closer examine issues involving several Member 
States. The broad approach reflects the fact that this is the first application of surveillance 
under this procedure and that it therefore has to cater also for the adjustment to previously 
accumulated imbalances. The Member States concerned are: Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, 
Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Hungary, Slovenia, Finland, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom.  
The identified Members States have different challenges and potential risks including 
spillover effects. Some Member States need to correct accumulated imbalances on both the 
internal and external side. They will have to reduce high levels of overall indebtedness and 
regain competitiveness so as to improve their growth prospects and export performance. In-
depth analysis will help to assess the drivers of productivity, competitiveness and trade 
developments as well as the implications of the accumulated level of indebtedness and the 
degree of related imbalances in several Member States. Some countries are experiencing rapid 
adjustment partly due to catching-up effects and these developments may require a closer 
examination. Despite overall good macroeconomic performance  some countries display 
developments in asset markets, including in particular housing, and a continuous build-up of 
indebtedness in the private sector, which also warrant further analysis.  
Finally, the economic reading of the scoreboard indicators points to the need for further 
horizontal analysis on the drivers and policy implications of large and sustained current 
account surpluses, especially in some euro area Member States. In the next months, the 
Commission will undertake further assessment of the divergence in economic performance 
across Member States, including exploring trade and financial interlinkages between deficit 
and surplus countries and examine ways for further re-balancing at the level of the euro area 
and within the global context. It will also assess the role played by structural factors, 
including the functioning of services markets, through their impact on domestic consumption 
                                                 
23  See also the Macro-economic Annex to the Annual Growth Survey: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-
2014/president/news/documents/pdf/annex_2_en.pdf 
24  This is also in line with the approach taken in the Commissions proposal .presented on the 23 November 
2011 for a regulation on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States 
experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability in the euro area – 
COM(2011) 819final.   
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and investment, as a driver of sustained surpluses and thus pointing towards the necessary 
policy guidance. In this context the Commission will also study further the role played by 
catching-up effects.  
In the context of multilateral surveillance and in line with Article 3.4 of the Regulation, the 
Commission invites the Council and the Euro Group to discuss this report. The Commission 
is also looking forward to feedback from the European Parliament and other stakeholders. 
Taking into account these discussions, the Commission will start to prepare in-depth reviews 
for the relevant Member States. 